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DA raises specter of judicial corruption in DeLay associates case
September 23, 2008

Travis County District Attorney Ronnie Earle on Monday raised the specter of judicial corruption as he pressed the 3rd Court of Appeals in Austin to reconsider an opinion in the money-laundering case against two associates of former U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay.

Written by Laylan Copelin, The Austin American-Statesman

Travis County District Attorney Ronnie Earle on Monday raised the specter of judicial corruption as he pressed the 3rd Court of Appeals in Austin to reconsider an opinion in the money-laundering case against two associates of former U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay.

"The dark shadow of corruption of our system of justice looms over this case," Earle wrote. "Every lawyer has a duty to raise questions of corruption that go to the heart of our judicial system, and it is in the discharge of that duty that the State pursues this effort."

Without naming names, Earle's pointed — and unusual — remarks were aimed at a panel of three judges, all Republicans, who last month upheld the constitutionality of the law used to indict DeLay and two associates, Jim Ellis and John Colyandro, on money-laundering charges dating from the 2002 elections.

The panel, however, volunteered that the state's money-laundering statute in 2002 did not cover checks, so charges against the trio might eventually be dismissed because they are accused of laundering $190,000 in corporate donations, banned from state campaigns, into legal political donations — all by check. DeLay's lawyers immediately declared victory, saying they would use the 3rd Court of Appeals' language to ask that a trial judge dismiss the cases against all three.

A fourth justice on the appeals court, Democrat Diane Henson, objected to her colleagues' handling of the matter. She criticized the three-judge panel for sitting on the constitutional questions for two years and then going beyond the question before them in the pretrial challenge. She also disagreed with their interpretation, saying the money-laundering law included checks. She urged that all six of the court's justices rehear the constitutional challenge, a suggestion the panel turned down.

On Monday, Earle, a Democrat, adopted Henson's complaints in his brief, but his strong language implying corruption caught the defense attorneys off-guard.

San Antonio lawyer J.D. Pauerstein, who represents Ellis, said at first he didn't know what to say about a lawyer making broad-based allegations about the very court he is asking for a rehearing.

"It is just way out of line," Pauerstein said. "That sounds like it was written by a politician instead of a lawyer."

University of Texas law professor George Dix suggested Earle's language might be interpreted more than one way. But he said it would be "very unusual" to imply that the judicial system is somehow corrupt without offering specifics.

It's not the first time Earle has used colorful language in prosecuting defendants accused of misusing corporate money in state campaigns. He once compared the Texas Association of Business, the state's largest organization lobbying for business interests, to fascist leader Benito Mussolini of Italy and robber barons. A trial court threw out that indictment.

Earle also is running out of time to prosecute DeLay, who retired from Congress last year rather than face defeat at the polls because of the money-laundering indictment. Earle is retiring in January.

Behind the scenes, Democrats have been agitated since last month's opinion, in part because it was written by Justice Alan Waldrop, who, before he became a judge, represented Texans for Lawsuit Reform. Officials from that group often met in campaign strategy sessions with Colyandro during the 2002 campaign.

Texans for Lawsuit Reform, however, was never indicted — or sued — as were DeLay, Colyandro and Ellis over the use of corporate money in the 2002 elections.

Waldrop did help his client successfully fight subpoenas for information in a civil lawsuit against Colyandro, Ellis and others. In that effort, he wrote that the lawsuit, which largely tracked the criminal indictments, was "politically motivated," and he conferred with some of the lawyers in the case.

Waldrop did not respond to requests for comment.

When the 3rd Court got the constitutional challenge, prosecutors were aware that Waldrop had represented Texans for Lawsuit Reform, but Waldrop's comments in a legal brief that the lawsuit was "politically motivated" only surfaced after last month's decision.

Lillian Hardwick, co-author of "Handbook of Texas Lawyer and Judicial Ethics," is an expert on when judges should recuse themselves from a case. Hardwick concluded that it would have been appropriate for lawyers in the case to ask the judge to remove himself at the start of the case. But because the lawyers knew about Waldrop's involvement in the civil lawsuit, Hardwick said, prosecutors probably have waived that right to remove him even if they have just learned of his written comments.

She said lawyers in the case had an obligation to fully investigate the judge's role in representing his client. She likened it to an Easter egg hunt with a deadline.

What about a judge's obligation to raise the issue? Hardwick said state courts, unlike federal courts, don't have disclosure rules.

She said Waldrop might have forgotten what he wrote about the case. Or he could have told his colleagues, and they decided it wasn't a problem.

"If that judge felt he could be impartial, if he felt his affiliation was common knowledge, why should he put it out?" Hardwick said.

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